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SELF-DEALING TRANSACTIONS IN NONPROFIT
CORPORATIONS
Deborah A. DeMott*
INTRODUCTION
Should directors of nonprofit' corporations ("nonprofits")
be as free to self-deal as their counterparts are in for-profit
business corporations? Will socially desirable consequences
follow if standards common in the foi-profit setting apply to
directors' self-dealing in the nonprofit context? This Article
focuses on nonprofits organized for charitable or public purpos-
es and deals much more briefly with nonprofits organized to
provide mutual benefits for their members. The Article argues
that, mutual benefit nonprofits aside, it is neither justifiable
nor wise to import criteria that legitimize self-dealing from the
for-profit setting to the nonprofit context. Part I examines the
nature of nonprofits and reviews a number of recent controver-
sial instances of self-dealing by nonprofit directors. Part II
then analyzes the possible legal treatments of self-dealing in
the nonprofit environment. Part III critiques in detail the
treatment of self-dealing in the Revised Model Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act ("RMNCA7). Finally, Part IV identifies the charac-
teristics of directors' service in the nonprofit environment that
make the RMNCA approach problematic.
I. NONPROFIT STRUCTURES AND ACTIVITIES
Private nonprofit corporations, which vary greatly in their
size, purpose and sophistication, are collectively a significant
force in the United States. Nonprofits are visible actors in
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1 This terminology, used in the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
("RMNCA"), is less precise than "Not-For-Profit," the term used in the counterpart
New York statute. Many corporations organized to conduct business on a for-profit
basis become "nonprofits" because they do not generate net positive earnings.
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many sectors, including health care, education and social wel-
fare services.2 As of 1990, revenues generated by nonprofits
accounted for roughly fifteen percent of the nation's gross na-
tional product.3 The defining difference between a nonprofit
and a for-profit corporation is the nondistribution constraint,
which prohibits a nonprofit corporation from paying dividends
or otherwise distributing any part of its net income or earnings
to the persons who control it.4 A corollary of the nondistribu-
tion constraint is that members of a nonprofit (other than one
organized for its members' mutual benefit) do not have a pro-
prietary interest in, the corporation comparable to the interest
that shareholders have in a for-profit corporation.5 Members of
a mutual benefit corporation, in contrast, may receive distribu-
tions by selling their memberships to the corporation.' Some
nonprofits that satisfy the Internal Revenue Code's criteria for
income tax exemption' are eligible to receive tax-deductible
2 Nonprofits are concentrated in labor-intensive service industries, which have
relatively low capital requirements. Religious groups are believed to predominate
as founders of nonprofits because they "provide the organizational ability, the ven-
ture capital and, often, low-paid or volunteer labor as well." See ESTELLE JAMES &
SusAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN MARKET ECONOMICS 50-51(1986). Private philanthropy also plays an important role in supporting "experi-
mental people and dissenting voices," whose projects are so controversial or idio-
syncratic that neither government support nor for-profit investment is likely. See
John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, in THE ECO-
NOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 246, 254 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
Indeed, Professor Simon argues that broadly-supported nonprofits are less likely to
support such projects than are narrowly-supported private foundations. Id. at 254-
55. For a definition of private foundations, see infra note 19.
' See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1578, 1581 (1992) [hereinafter Nonprofit Corporations].
4 See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.01 (1987) [hereinafter
R.M.N.CA].
' A further corollary is that in a merger transaction, nonprofit members do
not have appraisal rights. See R.M.N.C.A. § 11.01 cmt. The RMNCA denies ap-
praisal rights to members of all nonprofits, including mutual benefit corporations.
The drafters' rationale is that even though mutual benefits' members may have an
economic interest in the corporation, most memberships do not represent an in-
vestment that will generate a profit upon sale. Id.
6 Id. § 13.02.
' Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code limits the exemption from feder-
al taxation of income to entities that meet certain specified criteria. I.R.C. § 501(a)
(1988). In particular, § 501(c)(3) exempts entities organized solely for purposes that
are "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or education-
al" as well as entities organized "to foster national or international amateur sports
competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. §
501(cX3). Subsections 501(cX4)-(10) also exempt from taxation such entities as civic
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contributions from donors.8 Making a donation, however, does
not necessarily make one a member. The corporation's organi-
zational documents furnish the controlling criteria for member-
ship .
9
Highly-publicized incidents of self-dealing by directors and
executive officers have afflicted several well-known nonprofits
in recent years. In the most visible incident, the United Way of
America lent $2.1 million in 1990 to a for-profit spinoff headed
by the son of United Way's executive director. With the board's
support, the executive director, who received $463,000 annual-
ly in compensation, had previously created three for-profit
spinoffs that performed services for the United Way and
staffed them with friends and family members." In a less-
publicized incident in 1992, the San Diego National Sports
Training Foundation, whose purpose was to build an Olympic
training center, was reported to have spent $6.2 million on
contracts with firms run by the foundation's board members or
officers." In particular, the foundation hired a general con-
tractor on the basis of a consultant's choice without putting the
project up for bids. The general contractor, a firm controlled by
one of the foundation's board members, had previously em-
ployed the consultant as the president of its San Diego division
and was still making severance payments to him at the time
he made his recommendation. 2 Finally, and most recently,
the president of Boston University was reported to have re-
ceived $386,700 in connection with the University's 1989 sale
of its stock interest in a medical diagnosis company to a third
organizations, labor and agricultural organizations, pension plans, chambers of
commerce and fraternal benefit societies.
' Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a deduction for charitable
contributions; under I.R.C. §§ 170(c), § 501(c)(3), (1988), organizations are entitled
to receive contributions that the donor may deduct from his or her income.
' R.M.N.CA. § 6.01(a). No person may become a member without her consent.
Id. § 6.01(b). It is possible to organize a nonprofit with no members. Id. § 6.03.
Such a corporation would then operate with directors designated or appointed as
provided in its by-laws or articles of incorporation, see id. § 8.04(b), with a self-
perpetuating board, see id., or with delegates authorized to make decisions. See id.
§ 6.40.
1" See Felicity Barringer, Charity Boards Learn to Be Skeptical, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1992, at A1O.
" See Ralph Frammolino, Foundation's Contracts Go to Firms with Ties to Offi-
cers, LA TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at B1.
12 See id.
1993]
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party. 3 The University's trustees had previously granted the
president options to buy shares in the company. 4
To be sure, the merits of each of these transactions may in
fact belie their problematic appearance. Such appearances,
though, have significant consequences in the nonprofit sector.
As of mid-March, results from the 1992-93 United Way cam-
paign were down 3.3% from 1991-92 levels, despite continuing
demand for the social welfare services provided by organiza-
tions funded by the United Way. 5 Although competing chari-
table providers reportedly view the United Way's plight as an
opportunity, 6 another possible consequence would be fewer
donations overall to the United Way and comparable organiza-
tions. Moreover, donors to charitable nonprofits trust the
entity's management to use their contributions to further the
entity's charitable purpose. Donors' trust is undergirded by
the nondistribution constraint, 8 but it is likely to be under-
mined both by visible instances of self-dealing and by suspi-
cions that undetected self-dealing occurs. Trust is likely to be
fragile when one receives no economic benefit in exchange for
one's cash or property. Additionally, donors and prospective
donors, having come to distrust one nonprofit, may distrust
comparable organizations as well. In short, the negative
reputational consequence of one organization's tolerance for
self-dealing may not be confined solely to it.
13 Lawrence Ingrassia, Boston University Targeted by State for Alleged Abuses,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1993, at B10. The Attorney General for Massachusetts an-
nounced that he will take action against alleged abuses and violations of Universi-
ty conflict-of-interest policies. The Attorney General also alleged that the Universi-
ty had willfully filed a false report with the state in which it failed to disclose the
payment to its president. The University's President stated that he had returned
the $386,700 to the University and never received any benefit from its stock sale.Id.
14 See id.
15 See WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1993, at Al.
16 See id.
17 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 847 (1980).
"6 Additionally, § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no part
of the net earnings of a tax-exempt organization may inure to the benefit of pri-
vate individuals. See generally 1 MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES:
LAw AND TAXATION § 1lA:02 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (analyzing forms of impermissi-
ble private inurement).
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II. NORMATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATE SELF-DEALING
In the charitable nonprofit environment, how should state
organizational law treat self-dealing? Five basic possibilities
emerge. The first would parallel the federal tax rules applica-
ble to private foundations, which tend to be organizations sup-
ported for the most part by their founders or a small number
of contributors. 9 This first approach would prohibit specifical-
ly defined acts of self-dealing entirely and impose a financial
penalty on the self-dealer regardless of whether the self-dealer
realized a profit or inflicted a loss on the corporation."
A second approach, derived from the law of charitable
trusts, would make all transactions tainted by self-dealing
voidable at the election of the corporation, again regardless of
whether such a transaction demonstrably benefitted the self-
dealer or injured the corporation.2' The justification for using
the charitable trust standard is that, unlike a private trust, a
charitable trust has a purpose but no specific beneficiaries.
Thus, it lacks beneficiaries who could consent to the self-deal-
' Under the Internal Revenue Code, private foundations are a residual cate-
gory comprising all exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3) that are not public
charities under § 509. Section 509 identifies organizations as public charities on
the basis of the nature of their activities-such as religious, educational and medi-
cal research organizations--or, alternatively, on the basis of their support. Publicly
supported organizations receive at least one-third of their normal support from
governmental entities or from the general public. I.R.C. § 509 (1988).
' Under Internal Revenue Code § 4941, each act of self-dealing results in the
imposition of an excise tax on the self-dealer of five percent of the amount in-
volved. If the act is not corrected, the applicable rate is 200% of the amount in-
volved. An initial 2.5% excise tax is also imposed on the foundation's manager if
he knew the act to be self-dealing and willfully participated in it. Self-dealing for
these purposes means specific, direct or indirect transactions between the private
foundation and a "disqualified person," including substantial contributors, holders
of more than twenty percent of voting power in the entity, foundation managers
and government officials. Id. § 4941. Specified self-dealing transactions include sale
and leasing agreements, loans and compensation payments to a disqualified per-
son. In contrast, self-dealing by persons controlling public charities does not result
in private inurement, which violates § 501(c)(3), if the transaction was at arm's
length and the charity received fair market value from it.
Similarly, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") prohibits
defined acts of self-dealing involving employee benefit plans. See Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1988) [hereinafter
ERISA]. Like Internal Revenue Code § 4941, ERISA imposes an exemplary civil
penalty on self-dealers. See ERISA § 502(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i) (1988).
21 See 2A AUSTN IV. ScOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
170 (4th ed. 1987).
1993]
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ing, just as the nonprofit corporation lacks members with any
proprietary interests."
The third approach is based on the corporate law standard
applicable to controlling shareholders who engage in self-deal-
ing transactions with a corporation. This standard would make
the transaction itself voidable unless its proponent establishes
that the transaction was "intrinsically" or "entirely" fair to the
corporation.' This fairness standard encompasses both the
circumstances leading to and surrounding the transac-
tion-including questions of timing and disclosure-as well as
the transaction's economic terms, chiefly its price.' Separate-
ly, the self-dealer would be liable for any injury inflicted on the
corporation.'
The fourth approach would permit nonprofit corporations
to utilize the "safe harbor" or procedural approaches criticized
in Professor Seligman's article.26 A self-dealing transaction
would not be voidable if directors who lacked an interest in the
transaction had approved it after disclosure of the material
facts of the transaction and the self-dealing director's inter-
est.27 The disinterested directors' decision, if challenged in
litigation, would itself be evaluated against a nonprofit coun-
terpart to the business judgment ruleY
Finally, one could require administrative approval of pro-
posed self-dealing transactions, comparable to the SEC's statu-
' If a nonprofit corporation is analogized to a trust, the court could consent to
the transaction because the court may consent to a self-dealing transaction in a
private trust if the trust beneficiaries are not competent to consent and the trans-
action is in their best interests. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del.
1991).
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
24 See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
See, e.g., Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403 (Del.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 853 (1988).
' See Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 9 (1993).
2 See R.M.N.C.A. § 8.31.
' Even the drafiers of the RMNCA characterize the approach in § 8.31 as
something other than "the business rule." See id. at xxxvii. But the commentary to
§ 8.31 states that '[elven if the directors were wrong in believing that [the
transaction] was fair, the transaction will not violate section 8.31 so long as the
directors approved it in conformity with section 8.31 . . . ." Id. § 8.31, cmt. See
also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) ("A court cannot second-guess
the wisdom of facially valid decisions made by charitable fiduciaries, any more
than it can question the business judgment of the directors of a for-profit corpora-
tion.").
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tory authority to approve proposed acts of self-dealing by in-
vestment companies. 29 Administrative review mechanisms,
though, require a substantive standard against which the
agency may assess the transaction."0 As it happens, each of
these approaches currently enjoys support. Historically,
though, most courts in nonprofit self-dealing cases have ap-
plied either the standard derived from charitable trusts3 or,
acknowledging that the entity is a corporation and not a trust,
closely and skeptically examined the merits of the transaction
and the circumstances in its history.
I. SELF-DEALING IN THE REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT
CORPORATION ACT
In contrast, the treatment of self-dealing in the RMNCA,
released in 1987, adopts essentially the structure now typical
in business corporation statutes. Under RMNCA section 8.31, a
majority of disinterested directors may approve in advance a
fellow director's proposed self-dealing if the material facts of
the transaction and the director's interest are disclosed or
known to the disinterested directors.3 With such approval,
See Investment Company Act § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b) (1988).
Under the Investment Company Act, for example, the Securities Exchange
Commission must exempt a proposed self-dealing transaction from the prohibition
on defined acts of self-dealing between the investment company and any affiliated
person, promoter, or principal underwriter if evidence establishes that "the terms
of the proposed transaction, including the consideration to be paid or received, are
reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching on the part of any person
concerned," and that the transaction is consistent with the stated policy of each
investment company involved and with the general purposes of the statute. id. §§
17(b)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(b)(1)-(3).
31 See Ronald A. Brand, Investment Duties of Trustees of Charitable Trusts and
Directors of Nonprofit Corporations: Applying the Law to Investments that Acknowl-
edge Social and Moral Concerns, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 631, 658-59.
' Id. at 659. See also Oberly, 592 A.2d at 468 n.17 (judicial review of disinter-
ested directors' decision to approve self-dealing transaction would be "more search-
ing" for a charitable corporation than a for-profit business corporation, based on
the special duty of fiduciaries of a charitable corporation to protect and advance
its charitable purpose).
3 R.M.N.CA. § 8.31(b)(1)(i)(ii). The RMNCA states that
A transaction in which a director of a public benefit corporation has a
conflict of interest may be approved in advance by the vote of the board
of directors or a committee of the board if the material facts of the
transaction are disclosed or known to the board or committee of the
board; and the directors approving the transaction in good faith reason-
1993]
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then, the transaction is not voidable by the corporation. Addi-
tionally, and in contrast with many business corporation stat-
utes, the approval immunizes the self-dealing director from
any individual liability arising from the transaction.' 4 More-
over, the disinterested directors who approve the transaction
under section 8.31 need not comprise a majority of the entire
board. 5
Under RMNCA section 8.31, the statutory standard for
directors' approval of self-dealing transactions is whether "the
directors approving the transaction in good faith reasonably
believe that the transaction is fair to the corporation."36 This
standard closely resembles the comparable statutory standard
applicable to all acts of directors in for-profit business corpora-
tions, but with one variation. Under the Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, directors of for-profit corporations, in
discharging any duty, must act in good faith and in a manner
they reasonably believe to be in their corporation's best inter-
ests. Under the RMNCA, when nonprofit directors approve a
self-dealing transaction, the central question is whether the
directors in good faith reasonably believed the transaction to
be fair to the corporation, not whether it was fair. If financially
disinterested directors enjoy, in this context as elsewhere, a
presumption that they acted in good faith and in the
corporation's best interests," the plaintiff would have the bur-
den of showing that the directors did not in good faith have
such a reasonable belief. In operation, then, RMNCA section
ably believe that the transaction is fair to the corporation.
Id.
'4 In contrast, New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 715 does not ad-
dress the question of the self-dealer's individual liability. N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFTr
CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1993).
s RMNCA § 8.31(e) states that 'a conflict of interest transaction is authorized,
approved, or ratified, if it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the direc-
tors on the board or on the committee, who have no direct or indirect interest in
the transaction ... "
3 Id. § 8.31(b) (standard for public benefit and religious corporations). If the
corporation is a mutual benefit nonprofit, the directors need not act in advance of
the transaction and the "good faith ...reasonable basis" standard is inapplicable.
37 See R.M.N.C.A. § 8.30 (1988). Section 8.30(a) states: "A director shall dis-
charge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."
' See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
(Vol. 59:131
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8.31 closely resembles the business judgment approach de-
scribed in Professor Seligman's article.39 Whether this shift
away from most jurisdictions' present law is justifiable depends
on the assumption one makes about the care and competence
with which nonprofit directors discharge their duties.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF NONPROFIT DIRECTORS
There is ample reason to believe that the overall quality of
directors' performance in the nonprofit sector is less than in
publicly-traded, for-profit business corporations. First, because
they do not issue publicly-traded investment securities,
nonprofits are not subject to the extensive disclosure require-
ments, enforcement machinery and private litigation detailed
in Professor Seligman's article.4 ° Nonprofit directors thus
make decisions in a less transparent environment and informa-
tion about their decisions is not regularly exposed to the scruti-
ny of a broad audience. Their decisions on self-dealing ques-
tions typically become visible only in the wake of scandal.4'
Second, apart from private foundations, the risk of attract-
ing the wrath of the Internal Revenue Service does not operate
as a deterrent to self-dealing that is comparable to the impact
of the disclosure requirements described by Professor
Seligman. Under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, no part of an entity's net earnings may inure to the
benefit of a private individual.' If a tax-exempt charitable
corporation violates the general prohibition on private inure-
ment through self-dealing, the penalty is loss of tax-exempt
status. This penalizes the corporation's patrons and donors but
does not necessarily penalize the self-dealers.43 Additionally,
See Seligman, supra note 26, at 14.
O Indeed, Congress expressly exempted from the requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") securities issued by nonprofits organized for specified
purposes. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(4) (1988). A com-
parable exemption applies to the registration requirement imposed by § 12(g) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 12(g)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(D). Such exempt issuers are subject
neither to the periodic reporting requirements imposed by § 13, which apply only
to issuers of securities registered under § 12, nor to the proxy rules under § 14.
41 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
42 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see supra note 18.
' See Hansmann, supra note 17, at 874; Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 3,
1993]
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the IRS's enforcement resources are limited." Relatedly,
states' attorneys general, who have standing to investigate and
to sue to challenge nonprofit managers' abuses, have limited
resources as well.45
Third, directors' motives and incentives for service on
nonprofit boards differ dramatically from motives and incen-
tives in the for-profit environment. Most nonprofits do not
compensate their directors directly.46 Board members oftenjoin because they believe in an organization's mission and
contribute to it with financial donations. They depend heavily
on organization management to set the board's agenda and
provide information to the board. Many large nonprofits also
have relatively large boards.47 Some actors in this environ-
ment reportedly believe that directors who make financial
contributions have a reciprocal entitlement to self-deal.48 In-
deed the prospect of self-dealing may entice some directors to
serve and to make financial contributions to the organiza-
tion.49
In this environment-one not characterized by skepticism
and analytical rigor,0 the "reasonable belief' standard in
at 1601. Arguably, in extreme cases, self-dealing may also raise questions as to
whether the corporation is being operated exclusively for its eligible purpose under
§ 501(c)(3).
" See Hansmann, supra note 17, at 874 (noting IRS lacks "particula[r] zea[1)"
in this area).
4 Id. at 873-74.
" Standards adopted by the National Charities Information Bureau ("NCIB")
provide that a philanthropic organization should not pay fees to its directors for
serving on its board, although participation costs (such as travel) may be paid.
NCIB, STANDARDS IN PHILANTHROPY if (1991). The NCIB interprets the "no-fee"
standard to encompass a corollary standard that "[s]ituations where board mem-
bers derive financial benefits from board service should be avoided." Id.
"' United Way of America, for example, has thirty-four members on its board.
See Barringer, supra note 10, at A10.
" See Frammolino, supra note 11, at B1 (reporting view of nonprofit's vice-
president that self-dealing director, having made a financial contribution, was enti-
tled to receive contract to act as general contractor for construction project).
"' The drafters of the RMNCA state that "[tihe Model Act recognizes that
many individuals are elected to nonprofit boards because of their ability to enter
into or cause an affiliate to enter into a transaction with and for the benefit of
the corporation." R.M.N.C.A. § 8.31 official cmt. 1. Separately, the drafters ac-
knowledge that the statute's "underlying philosophy" is "contrary to the strict trust
concept that interested directors can never obtain a profit when dealing with their
corporation." Id. official cmt. 6.
'o In some sectors nonprofit boards are also visibly homogeneous. Reportedly,
(Vol. 59:131
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RMNCA section 8.31 becomes a charade. So long as directors
have some "reasonable basis" to believe a proposed self-dealing
transaction to be fair, the transaction is not voidable and the
self-dealing director is not personally liable. Nonprofit
boardrooms seem to be inhospitable venues for challenges to
the opinions of fellow directors and the internal and external
experts the directors may retain. Note that the statutory stan-
dard requires only a belief as to fairness-a concept defined in
the official comment as having the earmarks of an arm's
length bargain 1-not a belief that the transaction has the
best or most advantageous terms available to the corporation
under the circumstances. The drafters' failure to embrace a
more exacting definition of fairness is especially troublesome.
For example, a transaction may exhibit the earmarks of an
arm's length bargain by having terms that evidence negotia-
tion, and yet fall short of the best deal available.52 That is, a
transaction may have terms that are respectable but not no-
ticeably attractive or beneficial to the nonprofit corporation. In
any event, the dispositive question under the statute is wheth-
er the directors reasonably believed the transaction to be fair,
not whether a court concludes that its terms bear indicia of
arm's length bargaining.
These vulnerabilities are especially evident when a chari-
table nonprofit (like a hospital) sells all its assets to a for-profit
corporation controlled by directors of the nonprofit." Statutes
as of a decade ago the majority of trustees of art museums were graduates of Ivy
League colleges over sixty years of age. See Gordon H. Marsh, Governance of Non-
Profit Organizations: An Appropriate Standard of Conduct for Trustees and Direc-
tors of Museums and Other Cultural Institutions, 85 DICy. L. REV. 607, 612 n.23
(1981).
11 R.M.N.C.A. § 8.31 official cmt. 2a.
12 In marked contrast, under the counterpart California statute, the self-dealing
director or other proponent of the transaction would have the burden of establish-
ing three elements: (1) that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corpo-
ration at the time it entered into the transaction; (2) that the corporation entered
into the transaction for its own benefit; and (3) either that a majority of the
corporation's board of directors "in good faith determined after reasonable investi-
gation under the circumstances that the corporation could not have obtained a
more advantageous arrangement with reasonable effort under the circumstances,"
or that in fact with reasonable effort the corporation could not have obtained a
more advantageous arrangement. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233(dX2) (West 1990).
Alternatively, before or after its consummation the transaction may be approved
by the attorney general or the court in an action in which the attorney general is
an indispensable party. Id. § 5233(d)(1).
' See James F. Peltz, Lawmaker's Plans Could Make HMO Buyout Costly, L.A.
1993]
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governing nonprofit corporations require the net proceeds from
the asset sale, upon dissolution of the nonprofit, to be trans-
ferred to another eligible charitable nonprofit.54 Terminal self-
dealing transactions consistently are likely to be afflicted with
a bias toward undervaluation of the nonprofit's assets because,
dollar for dollar, undervaluation enhances the prospective
profitability of the for-profit purchaser.
Directors of the selling nonprofit are, analytically, in a
position comparable to for-profit directors who evaluate a man-
agement buy-out ("MBO") proposal. Reflecting on a decade in
which disinterested directors, acting as committees, reviewed
management buy-out proposals, Delaware's Chancellor-whose
court adjudicated most challenges to MBOs-confessed to hav-
ing "a painful awareness of the ways in which the [disinterest-
ed director] device may be subverted and rendered less than
useful."55 Long-standing deference to management may lead
to passive acquiescence when management proposes to buy the
entity. Events are vulnerable to stage-management by profes-
sional advisors, who may be tempted to substitute "theatre" for
facilitating the provision of "informed, energetic and commit-
ted" service by directors to their shareholders." If in the MBO
setting directors were, at times, less than optimal representa-
tives of their shareholders' interests, one would have similar
concerns in the nonprofit setting.
But one's concerns are deepened by the differences be-
tween profits and nonprofits. In some nonprofit sale transac-
tions, the selling nonprofit's directors have taken the position
that they need not evaluate the fairness of the sale price in
light of probable third party offers.5" Indeed, by definition all
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, § D, at 9A (describing proposed sale of nonprofit HMO to for-
profit corporation controlled by nonprofit's directors).
" See R.M.N.C.A. § 14.06(a)(6). If the nonprofit corporation does not dissolve,
in theory it could use the sale proceeds to buy another operating asset (like a
hospital), sell that asset in a second self-dealing transaction, and then repeat its
purchase and subsequent sale until it has no more assets. In practice, sales of this
sort are closely scrutinized by the IRS, which has retroactively revoked nonprofits'
tax exempt status when related-party purchasers buy assets at an undervalued
price and subsequently resell them for a large profit. See Peltz, supra note 53, at
9A.
, William T. Allen, Independent Directors In MBO Transactions: Are They Fact
or Fantasy, 45 Bus. LAw. 2055, 2056 (1990).
" Id. at 2062.
" See Peltz, supra note 53, at 9A.
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transactions for control in nonprofit corporations are negotiat-
ed transactions. In this context, permitting disputes over self-
dealing to focus solely on whether directors have some reason-
able basis to believe any given price is fair is unlikely to deter
probable and predictable abuses. Cases concerning for-profit
corporations recognize that self-dealing parties are apt to be-
have differently, as are the directors who approve the transac-
tion, when all parties know at the outset that a court will
independently assess its merits if litigation subsequently im-
pugns the transaction.58 Moreover, nonprofit members lack
statutorily mandated appraisal rights, a significant protection
in some types of transactions for for-profit shareholders.59
For these reasons, in the nonprofit context, a self-dealing
transaction should be voidable unless the transaction's propo-
nents can affirmatively establish its fairness to the corporation
at the time of the transaction. Separately, the fact that disin-
terested directors have approved the transaction should not in
itself exonerate the self-dealer from liability to the corporation.
These standards, which are also applicable to self-dealing con-
trolling shareholders, are more likely to deter problematic
conduct than the approach adopted by the RMNCA because
they envision judicial review of the merits of self-dealing trans-
actions.
Would more draconian approaches, if adopted generally, be
preferable to judicial review of the fairness of the transaction?
Some scholars have advocated extending the tax treatment of
self-dealing in private foundations to all tax-exempt charitable
nonprofits." The private foundation rules impose an excise
tax, calculated as a percentage of the amount involved in the
transaction, on the self-dealer and, in some instances, on the
foundation manager.6' The tax applies without regard to
' See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 939 (Del. 1985) (majori-
ty shareholder, prior to initiating merger negotiations to merge subsidiary with
itself, was aware of inevitability of litigation challenging merger; terms of merger
transaction and majority's conduct in dealing with minority shareholders satisfied
applicable standard of entire fairness).
" See R.M.N.C.A. § 11.01 official cmt.
60 See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 497, 569-70 (1981).
6' See supra note 20. Reportedly the private foundation standard created by
Internal Revenue Code § 4941 caused the Rockefeller Foundation to spend two
million dollars to move out of its offices in Rockefeller Center, even though it paid
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whether the self-dealer in fact profited or the foundation in
fact lost due to the transaction.62 Some self-dealing, though, is
truly benevolent. It is not unusual for directors of small
nonprofits to sell goods and services to the nonprofit at below-
market prices. In short, the private foundation
rules-generated by tax-driven concerns for tax exempts that
lack broad support-would be an over-deterrent if applied
generally.' Similarly, the treatment of self-dealing that typi-
fies the law of charitable trusts would deny nonprofits the
benefit of fairly priced transactions if any party with standing
to sue objected to the transaction.' To require advance ad-
ministrative approval of all self-dealing transactions seems
cumbersome. In any event, requiring such review does not in
itself establish the standard to be applied by the reviewing
agency. Additionally, not all states have the budget resources
to develop the requisite administrative expertise, which is
likely to vary in its nature given the diverse population of
nonprofits." Moreover, many nonprofits by definition support
activity that is too idiosyncratic or controversial to attract
the Center a regular rate of rent-a fact readily susceptible of verification in New
York City's commercial real estate market. See Discussant Remarks and Audience
Questions, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 765, 770 (1988-89) (remarks of Professor John
G. Simon).
6 See supra note 20.
Acknowledging the risk of over-deterrence, Professor Hansmann suggests that
the grasp of the private foundation rules may be avoided by restructuring some
types of transactions. Thus, a furniture store owner who serves as a director of a
day care center ordinarily would be prohibited from selling much-needed furniture
to the center at a below-market price. The director could, however, guarantee a
third partys extension of credit to the center, enabling it to buy the furniture
because the guarantee would be a "gift," which is not a prohibited act of self-deal-
ing. See Hansmann, supra note 60, at 571-72.
This line of reasoning is flawed. If the center buys the furniture in an arm's
length transaction, it presumably will pay the market price. Additionally, arm's
length parties do not extend credit for free. Thus, the center will obviously pay
more for furniture bought on credit than it would in a self-dealing transaction
priced below-market. Even if the director gives the center the difference between
the prices plus the cost of credit financing, the furniture still would cost more.
" See Brand, supra note 31, at 661-62 (advocating adoption of charitable trust
standard for nonprofit corporations).
' See Daniel L. Kurtz, Safeguarding the Mission: The Duties and Liabilities of
Officers and Directors, in COMMITEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUC., ALI-
ABA NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA
OF RETRENCHMENT 15, 41 (1992) (noting "[a] chronic lack of resources for enforce-
ment by public agencies").
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funding from either for-profit or governmental sources. A blan-
ket requirement of administrative approval creates the risk
that the agency will subject transactions to especially close
scrutiny when the nonprofit supports unpopular activities.
CONCLUSION
Apart from these basic questions concerning self-dealing,
other subsidiary issues in the nonprofit context warrant reflec-
tion. Fiduciary norms are neither self-executing nor self-enforc-
ing. One might wonder whether litigation as a vehicle to en-
force fiduciary norms is presently as effective as it might be
and, if not, how its impact could be enhanced. At present,
standing to sue is typically restricted to the corporation and a
state's attorney general;' some statutes, like the RMNCA,67
and some courts in the absence of statutory authorization,8
additionally permit members to sue derivatively on the
corporation's behalf. Perhaps standing should be expanded by
statute to encompass non-members who are substantial finan-
cial donors to the corporation.69 Relatedly, would the nonprofit
sector as a whole benefit from enhanced reporting obligations,
including mandatory disclosure of .self-dealing transactions?7"
To be sure, if answered generally in the affirmative, each of
these questions poses subsidiary questions of implementation.7
" See DEBORAH A. DEMoTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS § 2:04 (1987 &
Supp. 1992).
6 R.M.N.CA § 6.30; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1970
& Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 57106, 7710 (West 1990) (all authorizing
member derivative suits in public benefit and mutual benefit corporations, but not
in religious corporations).
6 See DEMOTT, supra note 66, § 2:04.
"' Some courts recognize the right of a donor or the donor's heirs to sue to
enforce the purposes of a restricted gift. See, e.g., Denckla v. Independence Found.,
193 A.2d 538 (Del. 1963). This principle of standing could support legislative ex-
pansion of standing beyond members to non-profit corporations' donors on the
theory that such donors give to further the organization's charitable purposes and
not to subsidize unfair self-dealing.
" See Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 3, at 1607 (observing that expanded
standing alone will not increase the information available to prospective plaintiffs'
attorneys, "the primary force behind any enforcement action").
71 Expanding the standing doctrine would raise a number of questions. To
reduce the risk of non-meritorious and frivolous litigation, it may be justifiable to
restrict standing to sue to substantial donors, but doing so seems blatantly
inegalitarian. Moreover, dollar for dollar, a wealthy donor's contribution costs that
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Such concerns aside, it is foolish to import for-profit norms
respecting self-dealing generally into the nonprofit context.
Governance mechanisms are so much weaker in the nonprofit
sector that loose controls on self-dealing create unacceptably
high risks of misconduct. Such misconduct, if it becomes visi-
ble, has reputational consequences unlikely to be restricted to
donor less than the contribution of a less wealthy donor. A separate question con-
cerns the type of action that might be authorized. As noted above, see supra notes
62-64 and accompanying text, present authority addresses derivative actions
brought by members and actions brought by attorneys general on behalf of the
nonprofit itself. Should donors, additionally, be able to assert individual claims if
the nonprofit engages in unfair self-dealing transactions? Donors might argue that
such self-dealing in economic fact constitutes personal inurement to those benefit-
ting from the self-dealing, personal inurement subsidized by their donations. A
secondary, more procedurally oriented question is the feasibility of a donor class
action consolidating such individual claims. A potential roadblock, however, to
maintaining such an action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is that do-
nors may well differ in the relief they seek; some may wish to enjoin or void the
self-dealing transactions, while others may desire the return of all or part of their
donation. This roadblock, though, could be overcome if the court is willing to cre-
ate subclasses among the donors at the remedial phase of the litigation. In any
event, a more substantive problem is that self-dealing transactions are generally
understood to injure the corporation itself, not its members or, in this context, its
donors.
Enhancing mandatory disclosure by nonprofits poses three questions: disclo-
sure of what, to whom and at what cost? A good starting point for the content of
the disclosure would be SEC's Regulation S-K, Items 401-04, which encompass the
corporation's executive compensation and self-dealing transactions. 17 C.F.R. §§
229.401-.404 (1992). The cost of preparing accurate disclosure documents, even if
their distribution is limited to an administrative agency or to substantial donors,
is a factor to consider. Closely related questions concern the constitutionality of
such disclosure mandates. The Supreme Court treats the solicitation of charitable
contributions as a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. See Riley v.
National Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988). In Riley, the Court subjected
to exacting scrutiny a state statute requiring charitable foundations to disclose to
persons they solicit the percentage of contributions they collected during the prior
twelve months that were actually turned over to the charity. The Court held that
this requirement of "compelled speech" was unduly burdensome to solicitors and
tailored insufficiently narrowly to achieve the state's objectives. Id. at 798. Argu-
ably, compelling retrospective disclosure about the use to which an organization
has put its assets is quite different from point-of-solicitation disclosure. Moreover,
Riley acknowledges that a state itself may constitutionally publish the financial
disclosure form it requires fundraisers to file, and it may "vigorously enforce its
antifraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money on false
pretenses or by making false statements." Id. at 800. Riley aside, beyond the mak-
ing of false statements, fraud conventionally encompasses making half-true state-
ments, knowingly failing to correct a misleading impression created by a statement
and, in some situations, failing to disclose information going to a basic assumption
that is not reasonably available to the other party to a transaction. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
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a particular nonprofit. Betrayed once, donors' altruism may be
jeopardized and all nonprofits will suffer as a result. At pres-
ent, the inhibitions to self-dealing in for-profits created by dis-
closure mandated by the federal securities laws are not paral-
leled in the nonprofit environment. Consequently, there is no
effective substitute for independent judicial review of the mer-
its of self-dealing transactions in nonprofits.

